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The author examines private access to the Competition Tribunal under 
section 103.1 of the Competition Act. After considering the proceedings of 
private parties that have taken place before the Tribunal, he analyzes the 
requirements that must be met in order to have access and the remedies 
available. Assessing these from a policy perspective, the author suggests 
two revisions to the Competition Act: lowering the standing requirement 
for individuals from having their businesses be “directly and substantially” 
affected to merely having their businesses be “directly and materially” 
affected, and expanding section 103.1 to include the possibility of bringing 
applications for reviewable practices falling under section 79.
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INTRODUCTION
In contrast with the experience of many other jurisdictions, including 
the United States,1 the enforcement of competition laws in Canada 
has historically been undertaken by governmental bodies. Prior to 
1976, individuals in Canada had no standing before courts to enforce 
competition laws or to seek damages for breaches of competition laws. 
Legislative amendments introduced in 1976—and continued in section 36 
of the current Competition Act—provided individuals with the right to sue 
for damages for losses caused by certain types of anti-competitive conduct, 
the most important of these being conspiracies.2 Section 36 has seen 
significant use, especially since the introduction of class action legislation, 
and class actions dealing with anti-competitive conspiracies are now 
increasingly being litigated in Canadian courts.3 However, the enforcement 
of many important provisions of the Competition Act, including the 
provisions outlined in Part VII prohibiting restrictive trade practices, 
remained exclusively in the hands of Competition Bureau.
Following a flurry of debate over allowing private enforcement,4 this 
situation changed in 2002 with the passage of amendments to the 
Competition Act, which gave private parties the ability to access the 
Competition Tribunal to challenge certain restrictive trade practices 
1  B.A. Facey & D.H. Assaf, Competition and Antitrust Law: Canada and the United States, 
3rd ed. (Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2006) at 489-90 [Facey & Assaf].
2  Competition Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-34, s. 36 [Competition Act]. Legislative amendments 
in 1976 provided individuals with the right under what is now section 36 of the Competition 
Act to recover damages for losses suffered in certain cases, but private actions under this 
section were limited by both a) the limitations on the type of offences for which parties 
could recover damages and b) the inability of parties to seek injunctive relief to prevent the 
wrong from occurring. See; also Michael Trebilcock, Ralph Winter, Paul Collins & Edward 
Iacobucci, The Law and Economics of Canadian Competition Policy (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2003) at 765-75 [Trebilcock et al.].
3  The legal and policy considerations relating to competition class actions in Canada have 
been explored elsewhere at length. See, e.g., Vol. 3, No. 1, of The Canadian Class Action 
Review, which was devoted exclusively to issues surrounding competition class actions.
4  See, inter alia, N. Finkelstein & J. Quinn, “Reevaluating the Role of Private Enforcement 
and Private Party Access to the Competition Tribunal” (Paper presented at the University 
of Toronto Faculty of Law, 8 December 1995) [unpublished]; Trebilcock & Roach, infra 
note 7; Roach & Trebilcock Article, infra note 60; Rowley & Campbell, infra note 8.
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in limited circumstances.5 While these changes represented in some 
ways a substantial break with the traditional model of competition law 
enforcement in Canada, little academic attention has been paid to them 
since their introduction.6 This article will seek to fill this gap by discussing 
two interrelated issues which have remained largely unaddressed. First, 
this article will provide a comprehensive overview of the legal framework 
for private party access. Second, this article will critically assess that legal 
framework by exploring why private party access is permitted under the 
Competition Act and whether the current framework optimally furthers the 
policy objectives of allowing private party access.
It is important to note that this article does not purport to provide 
a comprehensive theoretical analysis of the private enforcement of 
competition laws; nor does it attempt to provide an international 
comparative study of the framework governing private enforcement of 
competition laws; nor does it analyze in detail the substantive provisions 
in the Competition Act that are now enforceable by private litigants. While 
these are worthwhile research programs, these issues have already been 
examined elsewhere.7 This paper will not avoid these topics entirely, but it 
will only engage with them to the extent necessary to effectively analyze 
the current provisions. Instead, this paper focuses directly on the Canadian 
provisions governing private access in order to highlight the current state 
of the law and assess whether the law actually furthers the policy goals of 
the Competition Act. 
This paper will proceed as follows: Part I provides a brief overview of the 
private proceedings which have taken place before the Tribunal; Part II 
5  An Act to Amend the Competition Act, S.C. 2002, c. 16.
6  A cursory overview of the provision and some of the cases is available in John Callaghan, 
Ian MacDonald & Blair McKechnie, “What about the flood of litigation?”, online: (2005) 
Gowlings Lafleur Henderson LLP <http://www.gowlings.com/resources/PDFs/What%20
about%20the%20flood%20of%20litigation.pdf>.
7  See Kent Roach & Michael Trebilcock, “Private Party Access to the Competition 
Tribunal” (Hull, Que.: 7 May 1996) [Trebilcock & Roach]; R. Jack Roberts, “International 
Comparative Analysis of Private Rights of Access (A Study Commissioned by Industry 
Canada; Competition Bureau)”, online: (1999) <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSI/ct/roberts-e.
pdf>; see also Trebilcock et al., supra note  2 at Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 12.
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examines the law of private party access to the Competition Tribunal, 
both outlining the thresholds that parties must meet in order to obtain 
access and examining the remedies available to parties; Part III proceeds 
to assess whether the current legal framework of private party access is 
effective from a policy standpoint, and it argues that certain changes to the 
Competition Act would better serve the underlying policy goals of private 
party access; and Part IV serves as a brief conclusion. 
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF PRIVATE PROCEEDINGS 
BEFORE THE COMPETITION TRIBUNAL
Prior to the amendments which enabled private parties to access the 
Tribunal, some commentators argued that allowing private access would 
have disastrous consequences. Rowley and Campbell predicted, inter alia, 
that procedural safeguards would not prevent the flood of unmeritorious 
litigation and that the high costs relating to private actions would have 
an overall negative effect on the Canadian economy.8 Six years after 
the introduction of private party access, one can conclude that their 
predictions were incorrect. Between the coming into force of these 
provisions in 2002 and December 2008, the Tribunal has considered 
nineteen applications for leave to make an application under sections 75 or 
77.9 Of these nineteen applications, thirteen were dismissed and six were 
allowed. Of the six which were allowed, only one application has ultimately 
been adjudicated on its merits, where it failed, and a full hearing on one 
other is currently pending. Of the four which were allowed but never heard 
on their merits, settlements were achieved between the parties in two of 
8  J. William Rowley & Neil Campbell, “Private Litigation Over Reviewable Practices: A 
Cost-Benefit Analysis” in Should Reviewable Practices be Turned into Competition Torts? (A 



















Tribunal considered it; see Competition Tribunal, online: (2007)  <http://www.ct-tc.gc.ca/
CMFiles/CT-2007-002_0029_53PVI-582007-1463.pdf>.
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the cases, one application was withdrawn, and in one leave was rescinded 
under section 106.10 
These figures, if taken alone, suggest mixed results from the Canadian 
experiment with private access.  The anticipated flood of frivolous 
claims has not materialized, and with the possible exception of the two 
cases in which settlements were reached, private applications have not 
generally been successful, with the majority (68%) failing at the initial 
stage of seeking leave to bring an application.11 This lack of success by 
private applicants at the initial stage could indicate either that the claims 
were genuinely unmeritorious or that the rules governing private access 
prevented genuinely meritorious claims from being heard. The following 
sections address precisely this question by outlining and critically assessing 
the law of private access.
II. THE LAW OF PRIVATE ACCESS TO THE 
COMPETITION TRIBUNAL
This Part explores the statutory provisions and case law surrounding 
private access to the Competition Tribunal. It begins with an extended 















10  Competition Act, supra note 2, s. 106.
11  Of course, there may be other measures of success than simply success by private 
applicants at the Tribunal. The increased possibility of a company being subject to an 
application under section 103(1) may have resulted in increased deterrence of reviewable 
practices which thus could not be the subject of any application, though this obviously 
cannot be properly assessed. 
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A. Obtaining Leave to Make an Application
The starting point of an analysis of private access is its governing 
provisions. The foundational provision governing access to the 
Competition Tribunal is section 103.1(1), which, at the time of writing 
states: 
(1) Any person may apply to the Tribunal for leave to make 
an application under section 75 or 77. The application for 
leave must be accompanied by an affidavit setting out the 
facts in support of the person’s application under section 
75 or 77.12
There are three important aspects of this provision. First, there is no 
automatic right of access to the Tribunal; rather, a person must apply for 
leave. The conditions for obtaining leave are discussed in greater detail 
immediately below. Second, under the language of section 103.1 as it has 
stood from its introduction in 2002, an application can only be made 
under section 75 (refusal to deal) or 77 (exclusive dealing, tied selling, and 
market restriction), though amendments to the Competition Act included 
in Bill C-10 at the time of writing would allow applications to be made 
under an amended section 76 (price maintenance).13 Third, the application 
is undertaken primarily on the basis of affidavit evidence. The application 
is to be judged summarily, primarily on the basis of affidavit evidence from 
both parties and without an oral hearing.14 
12  Competition Act, supra note 2, s. 103.1(1). Bill C-10, the 2009 budget implementation 
bill, substantially amends the Competition Act. For the purposes of this paper, the most 
important modification is the amendment of section 103.1 of the Act to include an amended 
section 76 along with sections 75 and 77 as the provisions under which a person may seek 
leave to make an application. The amended section 76 introduces price maintenance as a 
reviewable practice. This change, coupled with the repeal of section 61 of the Competition 
Act, converts price maintenance from a criminal offence to a civil reviewable practice. Bill 
C-10, An Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on January 
27, 2009 and related fiscal measures, 2nd Sess., 40th Parl., 2009 [Bill C-10].
13  Bill C-10, ibid.
14  Barcode Systems Inc. v. Symbol Technologies Canada ULC, 2004 FCA 339, [2004] 
F.C.J. No. 1657 at para. 24 [Barcode (FCA)]. Section 103.1(6) permits the party served 














    Nadeau Poultry Farm 
Limited v. Groupe Westco Inc. et al., 2008 Comp. Trib. 6.
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Various subsections govern the requirements for obtaining leave. Section 
103.1(4) prohibits the Tribunal from considering an application for leave 
where the matter with respect to which leave is sought is the subject of 
an inquiry by the Commissioner, was the subject of an inquiry by the 
Commissioner which was discontinued because of a settlement, or has 
already been brought before the Tribunal by the Commissioner.15 Section 
103.1(8) specifies that leave cannot be obtained where the matter which is 
the subject of the application ceased more than one year prior.16 
Beyond the above requirements, the general provision governing the 
granting of leave is section 103.1(7), which states:
The Tribunal may grant leave to make an application 
under section 75 or 77 if it has reason to believe that 
the applicant is directly and substantially affected in the 
applicants’ business by any practice referred to in one of 
those sections that could be subject to an order under that 
section.17
In the subsequent jurisprudence, the Tribunal has parsed this provision 
into two distinct elements: “(1) the applicant is directly and substantially 
affected in the applicant’s business by any practice referred to in section 75 
15  Competition Act, supra note 2, s. 103.1(3), (4). In order to enable the Tribunal to more 
easily decide this question, section 103.1(3) requires the Commissioner to certify within 48 
hours of receiving a copy of the application for leave whether or not the matter which forms 
the subject of the application fits either of these conditions. Ibid. at s. 103.1(3).
16  Ibid., s. 103.1(8).
17  Ibid., s. 103.1(7). Under Bill C-10, the standard that would be applicable for granting 
leave for applications under section 76 of the Competition Act is not the standard outlined 
in section 103.1(7). Rather, Bill C-10 introduces a new section, section 103.1(7.1), which 
creates a modified standard which is solely applicable to granting leave for applications 
under section 76. This provision reads as follows: “The Tribunal may grant leave to make an 
application under section 76 if it has reason to believe that the applicant is directly affected 
by any conduct referred to in that section that could be subject to an order under that 
section.” Bill C-10, supra note 12, s. 431(4). While similar in many ways to the standard in 
the current section 103.1(7), the standard in the proposed section 103.1(7.1) differs in two 
respects. First, it removes any reference to an applicant’s business, thereby broadening the 
class of persons who can bring applications. Second, it only requires that an individual be 
“directly affected” rather than “directly and substantially affected,” as is the requirement in 
section 103.1(7). 
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or 77 of the Act; and (2) the alleged practice could be subject to an order 
under that section”.18 The following sections thus first examine the content 
of these two requirements, before moving on to the required standard of 
proof. 
1. “Directly and substantially affected” – The Standing Requirement
The first of the two requirements which the applicant must fulfill is to 
demonstrate that “the applicant is directly and substantially affected in the 
applicant’s business by any practice referred to in section 75 or 77 of the 
Act.”19 This requirement has been exceptionally important in applications 
under section 103.1. Indeed, in the vast majority of decisions where 
leave was refused, the reason for refusal was that the applicant did not 
demonstrate that his business was “directly and substantially affected.” 
It is also important to note that this requirement is effectively a test for 
standing. In order to be able to bring an application, an individual’s 
business must be directly and substantially affected by the impugned 
conduct; this implies that neither unaffected businesses nor consumers 
have standing to bring an application under section 103.1(7).20 Indeed, this 
interpretation of the purpose of this provision has been confirmed by the 
Federal Court of Appeal.21 
18  National Capital News Canada v. Milliken, 2002 Comp. Trib. 41, at para. 8. [National 
Capital News].
19  Ibid.
20  The rigidity of this requirement is demonstrated by the Competition Tribunal’s decision 
in Canadian Standard Travel Agency Registry v. International Air Transport Association, 
2008 Comp. Trib. 14, in which it held that a trade association representing a large number of 
allegedly affected businesses did not having standing to bring an application, as the applicant 
itself was not affected. From a comparative perspective, the class of parties who can obtain 
standing in Canada under section 103 of the Competition Act is significantly more limited 
than the class of litigants in the United States that have antitrust standing under American 
antitrust statutes. For useful discussions of some of the contours of antitrust standing in 
the United States, see Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State 
Council of Carpenters et al., 459 U.S. 519 (1983); Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 505 F.3d 302 
(4th Cir. 2007).
21  Barcode (FCA), supra note 14 at para. 22.
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In terms of the substance of what this provision requires, there has thus far 
not been any judicial consideration of the requirement that the business 
be “directly” affected. While the Tribunal has not yet had any reason to 
address this directness requirement, this language likely has the effect of 
denying standing to a downstream business whose business suffered from 
the anti-competitive practices taken against an upstream supplier. Thus, 
if a retailer’s business is negatively impacted by a producer’s decision to 
refuse to deal with a wholesaler who had been supplying that retailer, 
the directness requirement likely limits standing to the directly affected 
wholesaler rather than the indirectly affected retailer.22 
In contrast to the lack of judicial interpretation of the directness 
requirement, the question of when a business has been “substantially 
affected” has been explored at length by the Competition Tribunal. The 
threshold for what has been considered “substantial” by the Tribunal has 
been quite high. Noting the similarity in wording between section 75(1)
(a) and section 103.1(7), the Tribunal has effectively taken “substantial” 
to mean the same thing in the context of section 103.1(7) as it does in 
section 75(1)(a).23 Under section 75(1)(a), “substantially affected” has been 
interpreted to require an examination of whether the business as a whole 
has been substantially affected rather than simply examining whether a 
particular product or product line of that business has been affected,24 and 
this interpretation has been adopted into the meaning of substantial in 
section 103.1(7). Thus, in Broadview Pharmacy v. Wyeth Canada Inc., the 
Tribunal did not find a direct and substantial effect because the product 
which was the subject of the application only constituted 5% of the 
applicant’s sales of pharmaceuticals.25 Similarly, in Construx Engineering 
Corporation v. General Motors of Canada, evidence that a line of vehicles 
which was the subject of an alleged refusal to deal constituted 67% of the 
applicant’s sales of new motor vehicles was not considered to be sufficient 
22  This limitation is thus likely analogous to the limitation on recovery by indirect 
purchasers in American conspiracy class actions. For the classic case on this point, see 
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
23  Competition Act, supra note 2, ss. 75, 103.1.
24  Chrysler Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Competition Tribunal) (1989), 1989 Carswell Nat 720, 
27 C.P.R. (3d) 1, [1989] C.C.T.D. No.49, at 29-31.
25  2004 Comp. Trib. 22. [Broadview].
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evidence of a company’s business being substantially affected, since 
there was no indication what percentage of the company’s total sales this 
represented.26 Even more striking in this regard is the Tribunal’s decision 
in Sears Canada Inc. v. Parfums Christian Dior Canada Inc. and Parfums 
Givenchy Canada Ltd, where a loss of $16 million was not considered a 
substantial impact to Sears because “it [was] insignificant in the context of 
Sears’ $6 billion business overall”.27
By contrast, cases where the Tribunal has found evidence of a substantial 
impact have been those where the business of the applicant has been 
virtually ruined by the impugned conduct. In B-Filer Inc. v. The Bank of 
Nova Scotia, the Tribunal found that the loss of 50% of the applicant’s 
revenue constituted a substantial impact.28 In Robinson Motorcycle Limited. 
v. Fred Deeley Imports Ltd., an applicant’s business was substantially 
affected because it relied exclusively on the products which the respondent 
refused to supply.29 In Barcode Systems Inc. v. Symbol Technologies Canada 
ULC, the alleged refusal to deal forced the company into receivership and 
caused it to lay off half of its workforce.30 Thus, although there are not 
enough cases to make a definitive statement, it seems that the threshold of 
what constitutes a substantial impact is a high one. 
2. “That could be the subject of an order” – Establishing the  
Elements of the Practice
The second requirement for being granted leave to make an application 
is that “the alleged practice could be subject to an order under that 
section.” The initial interpretation of this section was muddled. In the 
first application under section 103.1, the applicant sought an order to 
compel the Speaker of Parliament to give him access to the parliamentary 
press gallery, alleging that the Speaker’s failure to do so constituted 
26  2005 Comp. Trib. 21 [Construx].
27  2007 Comp. Trib. 6, at para. 33 [Sears].
28  2005 Comp. Trib. 38 [B-Filer (2005)].
29  2005 Comp. Trib, 52, at para. 8 [Robinson].
30  2004 Comp. Trib. 1, para. 16-17 [Barcode (CT)]. 
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a refusal to deal. The Tribunal disposed of this matter by concluding 
that parliamentary privilege gave the Speaker of the House the right to 
refuse access to Parliament to individuals and that the Tribunal had no 
jurisdiction to consider this privilege; the Tribunal did not discuss what, if 
anything, an applicant was required to demonstrate under this part of the 
provision.31 In Barcode (CT), the second application to the Tribunal under 
section 103.1, the Tribunal removed this evidentiary burden altogether. 
The Tribunal ruled that in order to be granted leave to make an application 
to the Tribunal, applicants only had to demonstrate that their business was 
directly and substantially affected; in this case, the applicant did not have 
to provide any evidence of all of the statutory elements of the impugned 
practice.32
On appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal, the Competition Tribunal’s 
conclusion on this point was reversed. The Court of Appeal concluded that 
in an application for leave, “there must be some evidence by the applicant 
and some consideration by the Tribunal” of all elements of the reviewable 
practice which is the subject of the application for leave.33 This has 
remained the appropriate standard which has been applied by the Tribunal 
since Barcode (FCA). 
To summarize, the current interpretation of section 103.1(7) requires 
that in order to be granted leave to make an application, applicants must 
adduce evidence of two things. First, they must establish that their business 
was directly and substantially affected by the conduct of the respondent. 
Second, applicants must give some evidence that the respondent’s practice 
met all the statutory elements of reviewable practice with respect to which 
they are seeking leave. 
31  National Capital News, supra note 18.
32  Barcode (CT), supra note 30 at para. 8. 
33  Barcode (FCA), supra note 14.
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3. “Reason to believe” – The Evidentiary Threshold 
Having examined the elements which an applicant must demonstrate in 
an application for leave, it is also necessary to consider the question of 
the extent to which parties must demonstrate those elements.34 Section 
103.1(7) does not require that a claim be established on the balance of 
probabilities, but rather specifies that the Tribunal must have “reason 
to believe” that the elements could be made out.35 The exact content of 
this standard has fluctuated somewhat. The initial test employed by the 
Tribunal in National Capital News was that the application would have 
to be “supported by sufficient credible evidence to give rise to a bona 
fide belief ” that the elements of section 103.1(7) could be made out.36 
In Barcode (CT), the Tribunal held that this standard amounted to “less 
than a balance of probabilities” but more than a “mere possibility”.37 Some 
decisions have been decided simply on whether the Tribunal “could 
conclude” that the elements were made out,38 a standard which necessarily 
seems to conflict with the fact that a mere possibility is not sufficient. 
Thankfully, most of the case law has applied the initial test formulated in 
National Capital News. 
While the test to be employed has been fairly constant throughout the case 
law, the application of that test in determining what constitutes “sufficient 
evidence” has varied. In some cases, a relatively low requirement has been 
implemented, with the Tribunal accepting affidavit evidence and limited 
financial statements as sufficient credible evidence that the applicant’s 
business would be directly and substantially harmed.39 By contrast, where 
34  Obviously, the burden of proof must be lower than a balance of probabilities, since such 
a high standard would negate many of the benefits of an initial application stage. Moreover, 
it would be unreasonable to require a demonstration of the elements on an overly onerous 
standard simply on the presentation of affidavit evidence.
35  Competition Act, supra note 2, s. 103.1(7).
36  National Capital News, supra note 18 at para. 14; approved of by the Federal Court of 
Appeal in Barcode, see Barcode (FCA), supra note 14 at para. 19; applied in B-Filer (2005), 
supra note 28 at para. 52.
37  Barcode (CT), supra note 30 at paras. 12-13. 
38  Robinson, supra note 29; Quinlan’s of Huntsville Inc. v. Fred Deeley Imports Ltd., 2004 
Comp. Trib. 15 [Quinlan].
39  Allan Morgan and Sons Ltd. v. La-2-Boy Canada Ltd., 2004 Comp. Trib. 4 [Allan 
Morgan]. Note, however, that precise data is not required for every element. In Barcode, the 
13Vol. 18 Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies
no financial statements were given, the Tribunal has refused leave, stating 
that it would not rely on mere speculation;40 similarly, where financial 
information was provided in an affidavit but the basis or manner of 
calculation of that information has not been provided, leave has been 
refused.41 While these decisions seem reasonable, the more difficult ones 
to understand are those where some financial evidence has been adduced 
in support of the applicant’s contention, but the Tribunal has rejected 
the evidence as being insufficient, as occurred in Construx.42 These cases 
provide only minimal indication in terms of what the courts will accept 
as sufficient evidence, and the practical meaning of the test in National 
Capital News is somewhat ambiguous. All that can be said is that while 
the courts will certainly require some concrete evidence in support of 
the application, the amount of evidence which is required to constitute 
“sufficient credible evidence” is unclear.
One final evidentiary point which is worth noting is the impact of section 
103.1(11). This section specifies that “in considering an application for 
leave, the Tribunal may not draw any inference from the fact that the 
Commissioner has or has not taken any action in respect of the matter 
raised by it”.43 While this provision has not been judicially considered, 
its inclusion in the statute is nonetheless important. If the Tribunal 
were allowed to draw inferences from the fact that the Competition 
Commissioner had not taken action, a significant additional hurdle would 
be placed in front of any potential applicants. Especially insofar as one of 
the policy aims of section 103.1 is to allow private parties to bring valid 
claims when the Bureau is for some reason unwilling or unable to do 
so—an idea which is discussed further below—the absence of an explicit 
provision such as section 103.1(11) might have the effect of completely 
Federal Court of Appeal inferred that there could be a substantial lessening of competition 
based on certain facts of the case rather than being provided any evidence directly thereof. 
See Barcode (FCA), supra note 14.
40  Paradise Pharmacy Inc. and Rymal Pharmacy Inc. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Canada 
Inc., 2004 Comp. Trib. 21, at para. 23 [Paradise]. See also Annable v. Capital Sports and 
Entertainment Inc. 2008 Comp. Trib. 5 [Annable]. 
41  Sono Pro Inc. v. Sonotechnique P.J.L. Inc., 2007 Comp. Trib. 18.
42  Construx, supra note 26.
43  Competition Act, supra note 2, s. 103.1(11).
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undercutting the policy aims of section 103.1(1).
B. Remedies
The remedy available to parties who successfully bring an application 













available.45 Section 104(1) authorizes the Tribunal to grant interlocutory 
relief “having regard to the principles ordinarily considered by superior 
courts when granting interlocutory or injunctive relief.”46 The Tribunal 
has indicated that the governing test for interlocutory relief under 
section 104(1) is that found in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney 
General).47 Under this test, the applicant must establish:
1) that there is a serious issue to be tried; 48
2) that not granting relief will cause irreparable harm to  
     the applicant; and,
3) that the balance of convenience favours the grant of the  
     injunction.49
44  Ibid., ss. 75, 77.
45  Interim relief orders may be available even before leave to bring an application has 
been granted. See Canadian Standard Travel Agency Registry v. International Air Transport 
Association, 2008 Comp. Trib. 12.
46  Competition Act, supra note 2, s. 104.
47  [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311 [RJR-MacDonald]; see B-Filer Inc. v. The Bank of Nova Scotia, 
2005 Comp. Trib. 52 [B-Filer (Interim Relief Order)]; and Quinlan’s	
    of Huntsville Inc. v. 
Fred Deeley Imports Ltd., 2004 Comp. Trib. 28 [Quinlan (Interim Relief Order)].
48  Interestingly, in Quinlan (Interim Relief Order), ibid., the Tribunal rejected the suggestion 
that because the injunction sought was a mandatory interlocutory injunction, the standard 
should be the higher “strong prima facie case” standard. This is in tension with other 
mandatory interlocutory injunction cases which have employed a higher standard, though 
not necessarily the “strong prima facie case” standard. For example, see Dempster v. Mutual 
Life of Canada, [2000] I.L.R. I-3748, [1999] O.J. No. 3595 and the cases discussed therein; 
see also Parker v. Canadian Tire Corp., [1998] O.J. No. 1720. 
49  RJR-MacDonald, supra note 47.
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Although there have been few decisions which have considered 
interlocutory relief under section 104(1), the few decided cases thus far 
suggest that such injunctions will often be readily obtainable. The first 
factor above will most likely be met if the applicant obtains leave under 
section 103.1(7). With respect to the second requirement, the Tribunal 
in Quinlan (Interim Relief Order) held that there was no duty on the part 
of the applicant to mitigate by making alternative business arrangements 
and that the loss of sales and goodwill could constitute irreparable harm.50 
Finally, the Tribunal suggested that in a section 75 case, if the products are 
in ample supply—evidence of which is itself a requirement for obtaining 
leave—then the balance of convenience will favour the granting of an 
injunction.51 Thus, this suggests that interlocutory relief will often be easily 
available once the applicant has been granted leave.
In contrast to the United States, a successful applicant cannot recover any 
damages. Section 103.1 has no provision for the awarding of damages; nor 
do sections 75 or 77. Moreover, section 77(3.1) explicitly states that there 
may be no award of damages under section 77 to an individual bringing an 
application under section 103.1.52 While it is surprising that no analogous 
provision was inserted into section 75, this does not suggest that damages 
would be available under section 75 in an application under section 103.1, 
since injunctive relief is the only remedy contemplated in section 75. 
50  Quinlan (Interim Relief Order), supra note 47. Interestingly, in B-Filer (Interim Relief 
Order), where interlocutory relief was refused, one of the reasons that no irreparable harm 
was found by the court was that B-Filer had made alternative business arrangements; see 
B-Filer (Interim Relief Order), supra note 47. Thus, it seems that there is no duty to mitigate, 
but if the party does mitigate, it will be denied interlocutory relief. This could potentially 
create a perverse incentive against mitigation. 
51  Quinlan (Interim Relief Order), Ibid.
52  Competition Act, supra note  2 at s. 77.
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III. THE POLICY AIMS OF PRIVATE ACCESS  
TO THE COMPETITION TRIBUNAL
Having outlined the law on private access as it currently stands, this 



























appropriateness of these particular provisions, because it is the realization 
of the underlying purposes which is the standard by which the current 













examining a) the criteria for being granted leave to bring an application, b) 
the remedies available to private litigants, and c) the substantive scope of 
private party access. 













competition law is to protect competition, not competitors. Indeed, from 
an economic perspective, the harm of anti-competitive conduct is not 
that it harms competitors. Rather, the harm of anti-competitive conduct 
is the dead-weight social loss that occurs when markets are not operating 












Competition Act likewise seems to be the protection of competition. The 
purpose clause in section 1.1 begins by stating that “the purpose of the Act 
is to maintain and encourage competition in Canada,” and it then proceeds 
to list a number of reasons why competition is protected.54 While there are 












53  Trebilcock et al., supra note 2 at 40. For an economic analysis of the harms 
of monopolistic situations, see Chapter 1 of Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial 
Organization (MIT Press, 1988).
54  Competition Act, supra note 2, s. 1.
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competing goals55—the overarching objective is to protect competition 









that the majority of the most important substantive provisions of the 
Competition Act only proscribe conduct which harms competitors when 
that conduct also has an anti-competitive effect, and not when it simply 
has a harmful effect on a competitor.57 
This conception of the purpose of competition law has particularly 
important implications for the private enforcement of competition law. As 
Rothstein JA wrote in Barcode (FCA) with respect to private party access:
the purpose of the Competition Act is to maintain and 
encourage competition in Canada. It is not to provide a 
statutory cause of action for the resolution of a dispute 
between a supplier and a customer that has no bearing on 
the maintenance or encouragement of competition.58 
Thus, private party access is not justified on the basis that it can be used by 
parties to rectify private wrongs, but on the basis that it is instrumentally 
effective insofar as it serves the socially desirable end of promoting 
competition.59 
The theoretical strengths and weaknesses of permitting private 
enforcement of law in favour of public ends are well-examined by 
55  For the debate over how these goals are balanced, see Canada (Commissioner of 
Competition) v. Superior Propane Inc., 2000 Comp. Trib. 15, 7 C.P.R. (4th) 385 at para. 
404-413; Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v. Superior Propane Inc., 2001 FCA 
104, 199 D.L.R. (4th) 130, 269 N.R. 109, [2001] 3 F.C. 185, 2001 CarswellNat 2092, 3 
F.C. 185, 11 C.P.R. (4th) 289.
56  For an introductory discussion relating to the historical debate over the purpose 
of competition law in Canada, see James Musgrove, “Introduction and Overview: The 
Purpose of Canadian Competition Law” in James Musgrove, ed., Fundamentals of Canadian 
Competition Law (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2007) 1.
57  See, inter alia, Competition Act, supra note 2, ss. 45, 75, 77, 79, 92.















the litigation in Robinson v. Deeley cost order, para.31, the Tribunal wrote that “[p]rivate 
Competition Act litigation is an important enforcement procedure of the Act.” See Robinson 
Motorcycle Limited v. Fred Deeley Imports Ltd., 2005 Comp. Trib. 40. 
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Trebilcock and Roach and bear reviewing here. On the one hand, there 
are significant benefits which can flow from allowing private parties 
to enforce public laws: private enforcement can supplement public 
enforcement with additional resources, which is particularly important 
if the public enforcer has limited resources; private enforcers may be in 
a better position to detect breaches of the law; and private enforcement 
is an efficient means of holding public enforcers accountable for their 
decisions not to take action.60 These considerations certainly apply in 
the competition context, as the Bureau is resource-constrained and 
the cost of litigating complex competition cases can be high.61 Private 
party access to the Tribunal can thus play an important role in relieving 
the Competition Bureau of some of its responsibilities, rectifying any 
perceived under-enforcement, and ensuring effective competition. 
However, as Trebilcock and Roach note, there are also harms which 
can result from private enforcement of the law: private enforcement 
can result in over-deterrence; private enforcers can engage in strategic 
enforcement or bring frivolous claims;62 and private enforcement can 
undermine a coherent plan of public enforcement.63 Put broadly, this 
implies that while private enforcers may play a useful role in achieving 
a public end, because their incentives structure differs from that of a 
public enforcer, allowing private enforcement of the law may also result 
in certain societal harms. This suggests that private enforcement should 
be allowed, but the rules which govern that private enforcement should 
be structured in such a way as to attempt to bring private incentives 
60  Kent Roach & Michael Trebilcock, “Private Enforcement of Competition Laws” (1996) 
34 Osgoode Hall L.J. 461 [Roach & Trebilcock Article] at 488; see also the “Interim Report 
on the Competition Act” (Report of the Standing Committee on Industry, June 2000) at 
Chapter Six, online: (2000) <http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/committee/362/indu/
reports/rp1031742/indu01/13-ch6-e.html>, 
61  “Study of the Historical Cost of Proceedings Before the Competition Tribunal”, Report 
Prepared for the Competition Bureau, online: (1999) <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/pics/ct/
wiserep-e.pdf> [Cost Study].
62  Indeed, the potential for frivolous litigation is quite substantial. One study reported that 
between 1992 and 2000, only 1% of reviewable complaints were found by the Bureau to be 
meritorious of action on their part, suggesting that there may be a large pool of unsatisfied 
complainants. See Rowley & Campbell, supra note 8 at 56.
63  Roach & Trebilcock Article, supra note 60 at 488-89; this final concern is less of an issue 
in Canadian competition law since the Commissioner has a right under section 103.2 to 
intervene in a private application.
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in line with public aims, i.e., encouraging parties to bring meritorious 
litigation and dissuading parties from bringing frivolous or strategic 
litigation.
It is important to note that this conception of private party access 
is one in which private party access is instrumentally effective as a 
mechanism for fostering competition. Contrary to what Trebilcock 
and Roach suggest,64 allowing this type of private party access to the 
Tribunal should not be—and has not been, as evidenced by Rothstein 
JA’s comment cited above—justified on grounds of corrective justice. 
Corrective justice would require the vindication of an applicant’s 
rights where they have been infringed or violated.65 However, as noted 
above, the general conception of competition law is that it protects 
competition rather than competitors; a corrective-justice framework of 
private access would necessarily imply that a primary goal is protecting 
competitors. Moreover, it seems difficult to argue that any type of private 
right belonging to competitors is explicitly protected by competition 
law. This is because the Competition Act only prohibits actions when 
they have an anti-competitive effect and not simply when a business 
is harmed. For example, a refusal to deal which ruins a business only 
runs afoul of section 75 if it has an “adverse effect” on competition.66 
However, whether there has been an adverse effect on competition or 
not, the business itself has been affected in the exact same manner by 
the refusal to deal. If corrective justice was a legitimate rationale, the 
law would protect the business whether or not the practice caused an 
adverse effect on competition, while the law in fact only prohibits the 
practice if it results in reduced competition. Thus, although certain types 
of private actions not considered here, such as those permitting recovery 
by consumers under section 36, might be justified in part by theories of 
corrective justice, it is important to bear in mind that the private party 
access to the Tribunal considered by this article is justified by the social 
benefit such access brings in terms of protecting competition. With this 
64  Roach & Trebilcock Article, Ibid. at 488.
65  For a general overview of corrective justice, see E.J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995).
66  Competition Act, supra note 2, s. 75.
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in mind, the following sections examine the extent to which the current 
framework of private party access appropriately structures the incentives 
of private parties to bring them in line with the public goal of fostering 
competition. 
A. Obtaining Leave to Make an Application 
As discussed above, section 103.1(7) requires an applicant seeking leave 
to establish 1) that his business is directly and substantially affected by 
the practice, and 2) that the alleged practice could be subject to an order 
under sections 75 or 77. While much of the current mechanism for 
bringing an application is appropriate from a policy standpoint, the policy 
considerations discussed above would justify a different standard for the 
first requirement, i.e., the standing test.
Both a) the requirement to seek leave to make an application, and b) 
the requirement to give some evidence in support of each statutory 
element of a reviewable practice are reasonable from a policy standpoint. 
There are a number of reasons for this. First, an initial application stage 
provides an opportunity for frivolous or vexatious claims to be dismissed 
without exposing the respondent to long and costly litigation.67 Second, 
it provides an opportunity for novel legal claims to be tested at lower cost 
to the applicants, thereby actually increasing the possibility of a genuinely 
meritorious, though novel, claim being brought.  Third, by providing a 
low-cost forum for the adjudication of novel claims, the jurisprudence on 
the legal meaning of certain statutory provisions can be expanded relatively 
easily. Indeed, the applications brought under section 103.1 have provided 
at least some additional definition to certain provisions.68 This clarity is 
67  This goal has been successfully accomplished by the current provisions. While the 
merits of many of the cases are debatable, at the very least it seems clear that the applicant 
in National Capital News would have failed in an application under section 75. See National 
Capital News, supra note 18. A seemingly frivolous claim was also dismissed in Annable, 
supra note 40
68  At the very least, the applications under section 103.1(1) have helped define some of the 
outer contours of the requirements of section 75. Perhaps the best example of this is that 
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especially important in Canadian competition law, where few cases have 
been litigated and the contours of many statutory provisions are unclear. 
By contrast, the current test for standing—which requires that the 
applicant’s business be directly and substantially affected—is overly 
onerous. On the one hand, it does make sense to have some type of 
standing requirement. It is desirable that the applicant actually has some 
genuine interest in the outcome of the application in order to ensure that 
the applicant has an incentive to properly litigate what could be, if the 
application for leave is allowed, a long and costly process. On the other 
hand, there should not be an overly arduous threshold for standing which 
arbitrarily bars genuinely interested applicants who have a sufficient 
incentive to properly litigate a claim.69
The particularly problematic aspect of this requirement from a policy 
perspective is the notion that what is “substantial” is to be assessed in the 
context of the entire business. There are two problems with this. First, as 
noted above, in terms of the rationale for having a standing requirement 
in order simply to give standing to applicants who will take proper steps 
to effectively litigate the application, there seems to be no justification 
for denying standing to applicants whose companies have only had one 
product line of their business impacted; this is particularly the case if the 
degree to which the firm has been affected is still relatively substantial in 
absolute terms, even if it is not substantial in proportion to the total size of 
the business. 
Second, and more importantly, it should be remembered that the purpose 
of competition law is to protect competition rather than competitors. 
From the perspective of protecting competition, the assessment for impact 
should be with respect to the product in question rather than the firm. To 
give a concrete example, whether Givenchy refuses to supply its perfumes 
the meaning of “substantially affected” in section 75(1)(a) has been given some additional 
precision by certain decisions, e.g., Broadview, supra note 25; Paradise, supra note 40. 
69  Perhaps the most obvious example of this is in Sears, supra note 27. Given that they 
stood to lose about $16 million, it seems surprising to suggest that they did not have a 
sufficient interest to bring an application. 
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to Sears or to a small retailer which exclusively sells Givenchy perfume, 
the anti-competitive effect is equivalent, as the competition in the sale of 
Givenchy’s perfume has been reduced.70 If the purpose of competition law 
is to protect competition rather than competitors, then it seems arbitrary 
that the small retailer should be given standing but Sears should not.71 The 
focus should be on the anti-competitive effects on the particular product 
market rather than on the producer or retailer of that product. 
Given the policy considerations listed above, it seems that a better 
requirement for standing would be a provision that requires that the 
business be “directly and materially” affected rather than “directly and 
substantially” affected.72 The former term would still ensure that the 
applicant has a sufficient interest to effectively litigate the action, but it 
70  While a discussion of the anti-competitive effects of vertical restraints are outside 
the scope of this paper, for an overview of the economics of vertical restraints, see Doris 
Hildebrand, Economic Analyses of Vertical Agreements – A Self-Assessment (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 2005) at 11-23 [Hildebrand].
71  On a related point, this also suggests that the tribunal looking to section 75.(1)(a) in 
order to inform the meaning of “substantial” in section 103.1(7) may have been somewhat 
misguided. In the context of section 75(1)(a), the requirement of the business being 
“substantially affected” was a substantive statutory element of the reviewable practice, since, 
as Trebilcock et al. write, the history of this provision was that it was, atypically in the 
Competition Act, one that was—but no longer following the introduction of section 75(1)(e) 
in 2002—concerned with the protection of downstream businesses rather than protecting 
competition per se. See Trebilcock et al., supra note 2 at 420-21. By contrast, “substantially 
affected” in section 103.1(7) is not a substantive element of the reviewable practice but 
rather a provision which limits standing. Thus, the purpose of the term is different in the 
two sections, and the Tribunal should have considered this when interpreting “substantially 
affected” in the statutory context of section 103.1(7).
72  This point may appear somewhat academic, since applicants under section 75 would 
still have to establish that they were substantially affected under the second element of 
the section 103.1(7) test. However, an overly onerous standing requirement should not 
restrict the availability of standing to bring a section 77 application. Moreover, the second 
argument above also speaks to a modification of the meaning of “substantial” in section 
75(1)(a), so there may be reasons to change the wording in both sections. Note also that 
“materially” is the term favoured by Roach and Trebilcock, though they too would not 
have included the directness requirement. See Roach & Trebilcock Article, supra note 60. 
By contrast, the standing requirement which would be introduced by Bill C-10 for private 
applications challenging price maintenance is, as noted above in footnote , that a person 
be “directly affected.” The absence of the requirement that the person be “substantially” 
affected suggests an even lower threshold for standing than the “directly and materially” 
standard suggested here. 
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would not preclude a large firm from bringing an application merely 
because the effect on its business was relatively small. While this might 
seem to expand the number of successful applications—especially 
given the number of applicants that failed to clear the hurdle of being 
substantially affected—it should be remembered that applicants would still 
have to establish the elements of underlying reviewable practice including 
some type of harm to competition.73 Many of the frivolous applicants 
which were dismissed by the Tribunal for want of a substantial effect on the 
applicant’s business would still likely be dismissed for lack of an adverse 
effect on competition. The only difference is that meritorious applicants 
that could show an adverse effect on competition would not be prevented 
from accessing the Tribunal merely because their businesses were not 
completely annihilated. 
B. Remedies 
As examined above, while the current statutory framework allows parties 
to seek both interlocutory and permanent injunctive relief, it does not 
allow parties to recover damages. This section will consider whether there 
are policy arguments for allowing private parties to recover damages, as 
some have argued.74 It will conclude that although there may be some 
benefits in terms of deterrence from allowing parties to recover damages, 
there are stronger arguments to limit parties’ available remedies to 
injunctive relief. 
There are two potential ways in which allowing successful applicants to 
recover damages could structure private incentives in line with the socially 
desirable outcome. First, the potential for recovery of damages gives the 
aggrieved applicant a greater incentive to bring an application before the 
Tribunal. Second, the prospect of having to pay damages deters a potential 
offender from engaging in the anti-competitive conduct in the first place.75 
73  Competition Act, supra note 2, s. 103.1.
74  For example, see Trebilcock et al., supra note 2 at 82-89, 91.
75  Both these points are noted in a 2002 House of Commons Committee report on 
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Although both of these arguments seem plausible, they are much weaker 
upon closer inspection.
With respect to the first mechanism, it should first be noted that it is 
not immediately clear that an award of damages is actually necessary in 
order to provide parties with a sufficient incentive to bring applications. 
Between the introduction of section 103.1 in 2002 and December 2008, 17 
applications were brought by private parties under section 103.1 alleging 
reviewable practices under section 75. By contrast, since the introduction 
of the Competition Act in 1986, only five applications have been brought 
by the Bureau to the Tribunal under section 75. There has thus been a 
significant increase in the number of applications. Second, while the 
availability of damages awards might increase the number of meritorious 
applications, it might also increase the incidence of those that are frivolous 
or merely strategic. Furthermore, the potential for large damage awards 
might deter sufficiently risk-averse corporations from defending frivolous 
claims and instead compel them to settle. This could put excessive power 
in the hands of unscrupulous applicants. Third, even if in some cases the 
unavailability of damages provided no incentive for a party to bring an 
application under section 103.1, they could still either make a complaint 
to the Bureau about the practice in question or apply to the Commissioner 
to begin an inquiry under section 9.76 The fact that private parties do not 
necessarily have sufficient incentives to challenge every reviewable practice 
does not mean that the private party mechanism is ineffective. Rather, it 
merely highlights the fact that the Bureau and the existence of a private 
right of access are not alternatives, but are instead complementary, with the 
Bureau having a role in bringing certain applications which private parties 
do not have sufficient incentives to bring. 
competition law, which argued in favour of the availability of damages for successful 
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duties under section 9, see Charette v. Canada (Commissioner of Competition), 2003 FCA 
426, 2003] F.C.J. No. 1697.
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With respect to the second mechanism discussed above, although awarding 
damages to successful applicants would likely deter corporations from 
undertaking reviewable practices, there are two additional considerations 
which speak against permitting damage awards. First, there is always 
the possibility of over-deterrence. From a practical standpoint, it is 
exceptionally difficult to set awards in such a way as to provide the optimal 
level of deterrence.77 Moreover, the reviewable practices which can form 
the basis of an application under section 103.1 can in many circumstances 
have benign or pro-competitive effects. The possibility of high damage 
awards might thus deter corporations from engaging in such conduct even 
when it is not anti-competitive.78 Second, the possibility of significant cost 
awards being granted to successful parties may already provide sufficient 
deterrence against the most egregious practices. In B-Filer Inc. et al. v. The 
Bank of Nova Scotia, the only application under section 103.1 which was 
litigated to conclusion, the Tribunal awarded costs to the respondent of 
almost $900,000.79 Because of the complexity of competition litigation, the 
potential for large cost awards being made against the losing party is high. 
Thus, at least some measure of anti-competitive conduct may already be 
deterred without the need for significant damage awards.
These observations provide preliminary support for the conclusion that 
damages should not be available to successful litigants in private actions 
under section 103.1. However, this paper should not be taken to endorse 
the proposition that damages should not be awarded. The desirability 
of damage awards is, using the framework developed above, a question 
of striking the optimal balance between the benefit of deterring anti-
competitive conduct and the harm of frivolous or strategic litigation. While 
the discussion above suggests that, at the moment, the appropriate balance 
is already being achieved without the availability of damage awards, a 
















assessing that optimal level, see William Breit & Kenneth G. Elzinga, “Private Antitrust 
Enforcement: The New Learning” (1985) 28 J.L. & Econ. 405 at 407-413.
78  For a discussion of some of the benign or even efficiency-enhancing effects of reviewable 
practices, see Hildebrand, supra note 70 at 16-18; see also Trebilcock et al., supra note 2 at 
424, 468-73.
79  B-Filer Inc. et al. v. The Bank of Nova Scotia, 2007 Comp. Trib. 29.
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work that is beyond the scope of this paper. It is sufficient for the moment 
to remark that damage awards should not be made available without the 
existence of evidence which contradicts the observations and arguments 
developed above, and any move to introduce damage awards should thus 
be based on a demonstrable rather than a hypothesized need to deter anti-
competitive conduct.
As a final point on this issue, in accordance with the framework developed 
above, this paper now notes one argument that should not be taken to 
support the availability of damages for successful litigants. In addition 
to the instrumental deterrence-based rationales examined above, some 
have argued in favour of the availability of damages in such actions on 
somewhat correctivist grounds, suggesting that parties have a right to be 
compensated for harms suffered as a result of another’s anti-competitive 
conduct.80 However, for the reasons examined above, this justification has 
and ought to have limited application in the context of section 103.1, as 
the purpose of this provision and the Competition Act generally relates to 
the protection of competitive markets as an objective in and of itself, rather 
than the protection or provision of any non-instrumental right to individual 
competitors. Thus, any justification for awarding damages in actions under 
section 103.1 should be based on instrumental considerations rather than on 
the notion that competitors possess any inherent right not to be harmed by 
anti-competitive conduct that section 103.1 allows them to vindicate.
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Committee on Industry, Science and Technology noted that “[t]he right to sue for damages 
is a fundamental right accorded to plaintiffs in civil proceedings throughout the world. It is 
an injustice that applicants in Tribunal proceedings should be denied the same fundamental 
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C-10 becomes law, under an amended section 76. In questioning what 
applications private parties should be permitted to bring, the fundamental 
policy issue remains the same as above; the potential for more effective 
enforcement of competition laws must be balanced against the potential 
harm of strategic or frivolous litigation. Based on these considerations, 
this paper argues that there is a strong case for allowing private parties to 














market, is a broad provision which can capture a wide cross-section of 
anti-competitive acts.82 Section 79(1) states that:
(1) Where, on application by the Commissioner, the Tribunal 
finds that 
(a) one or more persons substantially or completely 
control, throughout Canada or any area thereof, a class or 
species of business,
(b) that person or those persons have engaged in or are 
engaging in a practice of anti-competitive acts, and
(c) the practice has had, is having or is likely to have the 
effect of preventing or lessening competition substantially 
in a market,
the Tribunal may make an order prohibiting all or any of 
those persons from engaging in that practice.83 
81  This proposal is by no means unprecedented. A 2002 House of Commons committee 
report recommended expanding the private right of access to include actions under section 
79 of the Competition Act. Committee Report, supra note 75 at 50. In its response to this 
proposal, the government indicated that it preferred to wait until the effect of private party 
access under section 75 and section 77 could be assessed before making a decision as to 
whether to expand it to section 79. See Government Response to the Report of the House of 
Commons Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology “A Plan to Modernize 
Canada’s Competition Regime” (October 2002) at 9.
82  For an overview of the law relating to abuse of dominance, see Trebilcock et al., supra 
note 2 at Chapter 8. 
83  Competition Act, supra note 2, s. 79.
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The breadth of this provision stems from the scope of the term “anti-
competitive act,” which is defined in section 78(1) by reference to a non-
exhaustive list of eleven examples of anti-competitive acts, and which was 
held in Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Nutrasweet Co. to 
include any acts with an anti-competitive purpose.84 
It seems likely that private applications under section 79 would provide 
more effective enforcement of the Competition Act. As with all reviewable 
practices, the private applicants may have better information about the 
impugned practice than would the Bureau, as well as a greater incentive 
to bring the application. Given the breadth of section 79, the fact that only 
nine applications have been brought under its aegis by the Bureau since 
1986 suggests that the Bureau may be overly conservative in enforcing 
the provision.85 Indeed, the high success rate of the Bureau in section 79 
applications suggests that they will only bring an application under section 
79 if they are very likely to be successful.86 This suggests that there may be 
a role for private parties to play in enforcing the provision in borderline 
cases. Moreover, if private applicants were to appropriate some of the 
Bureau’s role in enforcing section 79, this would provide the Bureau with 
more resources to devote to effectively enforcing those areas of competition 
law where private enforcement would be especially problematic, such as 
in the merger review process. Finally, given the breadth of the statutory 
provision and the scant judicial consideration it has received, there may be 
significant benefits from increased litigation which can adequately define 
the contours of these provisions. 
By contrast, there are not significant concerns over the potential for a flood 
of strategic or frivolous litigation if private applications can be brought 
84  Ibid., s. 78; Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Nutrasweet Co. (1990), 32 
C.P.R. (3d) 1 (Comp. Trib) [Nutrasweet].
85  Mark Katz, “Abuse of Dominance” in James Musgrove, ed., Fundamentals of Canadian 
Competition Law (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2007) 147 at 149.
86  The high cost of abuse of dominance applications may explain the limited number 
of applications brought by the Bureau. One study estimated the costs to the Bureau of 
investigating and prosecuting NutraSweet at $1,449,195 and Tele-Direct at $2,726,888; see 
Cost Study, supra note 61 at 19. Nutrasweet, supra note 84; Canada (Director of Investigation 
and Research) v. Tele-Direct (Publications) Inc. (1997), 73 C.P.R. (3d) 1 (Comp. Trib.). 
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under section 79. There are two reasons for this. First, the statutory terms 
of section 79 provide an internal check on the number of potentially 
meritorious suits which the Tribunal could allow. Section 79(1)(a) limits 
the provision to situations where “one or more persons substantially or 
completely control, throughout Canada or any area thereof, a class or 
species of business.” The Tribunal has stated that there will not be a prima 
facie finding of dominance if the respondent’s market share is lower 
than 50%.87 This means that the class of businesses to which section 79 
could potentially apply is much smaller than that to which sections 75 
or 77 could apply. Moreover, the Federal Court of Appeal recently held 
that section 79(1)(b) requires some aspect of an anti-competitive intent, 
though subjective intent need not be demonstrated.88 Furthermore, the 
court held that “proof of a valid business justification for the conduct 
in question can overcome the deemed intention arising from the 
actual or foreseeable effects of the conduct, by showing that such anti-
competitive effects are not in fact the overriding purpose of the conduct 
in question”.89 This can provide respondents with a strong defence to 
an action under section 79. Finally, unlike section 75(1)(e) which only 
requires an “adverse effect on competition”, section 79(1)(c) requires 
the prevention or substantial lessening of the competition.90 Thus, this 
overview of the statutory requirements of section 79(1) suggests that 
the difficulties in establishing that a violation of section 79 occurred 
may significantly dissuade private litigants from bringing unmeritorious 
claims. 
Second, the incentive to bring frivolous litigation is further dampened 
by the high costs that losing applicants may have to bear. This effect may 
be especially pronounced in abuse of dominance cases, where the factual 
and legal issues can be more complex and the costs of litigating even 
higher than in other types of competition actions.91 Thus, the difficulties 
87  Canada (Director of Investigation & Research) v. Laidlaw Waste Systems Ltd., [1992] 
C.C.T.D. No. 1, 40 C.P.R. (3d) 289, at para. 68.
88  Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v. Canada Pipe Co., 2006 FCA 233, 49 C.P.R. 
(4th) 241, 268 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 350 N.R. 291, [2007] 2 F.C.R. 3. 
89  Ibid., at para. 73.
90  Competition Act, supra note 2, ss. 75, 79.
91  See Cost Study, supra note 61 at 19.
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in establishing an offence, combined with the possibility of a high adverse 
cost order, will likely provide a deterrent to the bringing of frivolous or 
strategic actions under section 79. 
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper has explored and critically assessed the current framework 
of private access to the Competition Tribunal. First, it has provided a 
systematic overview of some of the provisions governing private party 
access to the Tribunal. This discussion suggests that while the case law 
on private party access is slowly starting to flesh out the content of 
section 103.1, there remain some ambiguities, particularly with respect 
to what constitutes “sufficient credible evidence” to justify granting leave. 
Applicants should have an understanding of exactly what is required of 
them at the initial stage of seeking leave, and clarity from the Tribunal on 
this point would be a welcome development.
Second, this paper has evaluated these provisions from a policy 
perspective in order to determine whether the current regime is an 
optimal one in furthering the goals and purposes of competition law in 
Canada. This was based on a consideration of the degree to which the 
current framework of private party access appropriately structures the 
incentives of private parties to align them with the public goal of fostering 
competition by providing incentives to bring meritorious litigation  while 
still deterring frivolous or strategic litigation. Based on this analysis, 
two modest revisions to the Competition Act were proposed: lowering 
the standing requirement for individuals from having their businesses be 
“directly and substantially” affected to merely having their businesses be 
“directly and materially” affected; and expanding section 103.1 to include 
the possibility of bringing applications for reviewable practices falling 
under section 79.
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While there are legitimate concerns that the expansion of a private right 
of access to the Tribunal could result in an explosion of costly competition 
litigation, the above analysis suggests that these concerns are limited 
with respect to the changes proposed. While both the lowering of the 
standing requirement and the expansion of private access to section 79 
would increase the amount of litigation, frivolous and strategic litigation 
would still be a) dismissed at the Tribunal stage, thereby minimizing 
social costs, and b) deterred by the power of the Tribunal to award costs to 
the successful party. Thus, the proposed revisions represent incremental 
changes which would not open the floodgates to unmeritorious litigation, 
but which would rationalize the structure of private party access to align it 
with the underlying policies of permitting that access.
